​Are multinational military exercises (MMEs) effective tools of public diplomacy? Research shows their efficacy in improving states’ fighting capacity and signaling resolve to third parties, but how do domestic audiences respond? Along with troops and armaments, militaries deploy public relations teams to exercises abroad responsible for improving host attitudes towards their country. Officials broadcast messages of friendship between partner nations, but the presence of foreign forces can trigger fears of imperialism. I build an Unexpected Event during Survey Design by combining Pew Global Attitudes Surveys with MME start dates. Results show that public diplomacy via MME is conditional on the presence of alliances. Without a formal treaty, foreigners are deemed intruders and worsen public opinion, whereas visiting allies are seen as upholding their commitments and improve host attitudes. Results carry implications for studies of grand strategy by presenting a trade-off between hard and soft power gained or lost through military exercises.

China is the largest bilateral development financier in the 21st century, but what determines where funds go? Existing research looks at bilateral relationships between donor and recipient along with state-level characteristics. However, monetary disbursements also depend on recipient relationships with third parties, such as subordination under American hierarchy. The United States maintains hierarchical relationships that provide side payments to junior partners in exchange for their acquiescence to the liberal international order. Washington induces subordinates to reject revisionist policies by credibly threatening to withhold economic and defensive benefits. Recognizing that subordinates are less likely to realign foreign policy, Beijing directs less financing to these countries. As dependence on the United States increases, this relationship strengthens. We use a series of two-stage models to show that both selection effects and hierarchical relationships influence development financing. Our findings contribute to studies of Chinese revisionism, American hierarchy, and modern great power competition.

International Relations (IR) scholarship connects country membership in international organizations (IOs) to changes in domestic policy. Recent studies have relaxed the assumption of states as unitary actors in theorizing this link through sub-state actors like bureaucrats, military and political elites. We build on this literature by introducing another category of sub-state actor that is both influenced by IO membership and holds domestic agenda-setting power: political parties. Parties are sub-state actors who seek office in part by differentiating themselves on policies to attract specific constituencies. Existing party research shows that membership in economic organizations like the European Union constricts the available policy space through supranational regulation, increasing costs for parties to take positions that contradict the IO. However, party politics research has yet to investigate the influence of membership in defensive organizations like NATO. We argue that parties face pressure to maintain their country's reputation, follow laws, and achieve productivity gains through international cooperation; these constraints are underscored by domestic pressure from voters who prefer that their country follow through on its international commitments. We investigate how membership in defensive IOs influences state behavior by comparing party positions on various foreign policies according to the Comparative Manifesto Project before and after their country joins the Partnership for Peace (PFP) and NATO. We show that, after ascension to the alliance, parties exhibit less differentiation on foreign policy. As a result of this reduced ability to stand out on military issues, parties emphasize those political issues less overall.

We analyze a model of collective deterrence in which (a) a revisionist power may challenge a status quo guaranteed by a great power and several potential coalition partners, (b) defending the status quo is a pure public good for partners but gives some private benefits to the great power, and (c) status quo players’ costs for fighting are private information.  We mathematically prove the existence of an equilibrium in which the revisionist power conditionally challenges and status quo actors conditionally form a coalition and fight.  We then explore the behavior space using Monte Carlo Simulations.  Results from simulation analysis show that larger coalitions are more likely to deter revisionist challenges but, when challenges occur, also cause higher levels of free-riding on partners' war efforts.