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Published Works

Galambos, K. and Nurullayev, D. Accepted. U.S. Hierarchy, Chinese Development Finance, and Great Power Competition. Foreign Policy Analysis.

Wolford, S., Landry, J., & Galambos, K. 2026. Collective deterrence. International Organization, 1-38. https://doi.org/10.1017/S002081832610143X

McDonald, P.J. and Galambos, K., 2024. Trilateral politics in hierarchy, war, and state formation. International Theory, 16(2), pp.178-210. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1752971923000209

Galambos, K., 2024. Military exercises and network effects. International Studies Quarterly, 68(1), p.sqae004. https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqae004

Working Papers

Military Exercises and Public Opinion

How do individuals respond to the presence of foreign military forces? Studies show

that local attitudes are shaped by visitors such as American troops deployed to overseas bases. Yet, many more counties send troops abroad to participate in multinational

military exercises. MMEs, or war games, are rehearsals for future military operations.

Existing MME scholarship conceptualizes these events as state-level partnerships that

improve warfighting interoperability and deter adversaries, leaving their micro-level

effects unexplored. This study addresses that gap by building an Unexpected Event

during Survey Design, combining Pew Global Attitudes Surveys with MME start dates.

Results indicate that MMEs conditionally affect public opinion. While the average exercise worsens local attitudes, war games among allies produce null effects. Next,

external threats proxied by heightened fears of Russian aggression after the 2014 annexation of Crimea increased favorable reactions to visiting forces, whereas external

threats proxied by rivals appear to not change local attitudes. Findings indicate that

the majority of MMEs do not improve public attitudes towards visiting forces and

imply that countries participating in exercises face a trade-off between increasing hard

and soft power.

NATO and Party Politics (with Connor Dye)

International Relations (IR) scholarship connects country membership in international organizations (IOs) to changes in domestic policy. Recent studies have relaxed the assumption of states as unitary actors in theorizing this link through sub-state actors like bureaucrats, military and political elites. We build on this literature by introducing another category of sub-state actor that is both influenced by IO membership and holds domestic agenda-setting power: political parties. Parties are sub-state actors who seek office in part by differentiating themselves on policies to attract specific constituencies. Existing party research shows that membership in economic organizations like the European Union constricts the available policy space through supranational regulation, increasing costs for parties to take positions that contradict the IO. However, party politics research has yet to investigate the influence of membership in defensive organizations like NATO. We argue that parties face pressure to maintain their country's reputation, follow laws, and achieve productivity gains through international cooperation; these constraints are underscored by domestic pressure from voters who prefer that their country follow through on its international commitments. We investigate how membership in defensive IOs influences state behavior by comparing party positions on various foreign policies according to the Comparative Manifesto Project before and after their country joins the Partnership for Peace (PFP) and NATO. We show that, after ascension to the alliance, parties exhibit less differentiation on foreign policy. As a result of this reduced ability to stand out on military issues, parties emphasize those political issues less overall.

Data

1 / Multinational Military Exercises, 1980 - 2010 (with Vito D'Orazio)

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