Under Review 

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Are multinational military exercises (MMEs) effective tools of public diplomacy? Research shows their efficacy in improving states’ fighting capacity and signaling resolve to third parties, but how do domestic audiences respond? Along with troops and armaments, militaries deploy public relations teams to exercises abroad responsible for improving host attitudes towards their country. Officials broadcast messages of friendship between partner nations, but the presence of foreign forces can trigger fears of imperialism. I build an Unexpected Event during Survey Design by combining Pew Global Attitudes Surveys with MME start dates. Results show that public diplomacy via MME is conditional on the presence of alliances. Without a formal treaty, foreigners are deemed intruders and worsen public opinion, whereas visiting allies are seen as upholding their commitments and improve host attitudes. Results carry implications for studies of grand strategy by presenting a trade-off between hard and soft power gained or lost through military exercises.

We analyze a model of collective deterrence in which (a) a revisionist power may challenge a status quo guaranteed by a great power and several potential coalition partners, (b) defending the status quo is a pure public good for partners but gives some private benefits to the great power, and (c) status quo players’ costs for fighting are private information.  We mathematically prove the existence of an equilibrium in which the revisionist power conditionally challenges and status quo actors conditionally form a coalition and fight.  We then explore the behavior space using Monte Carlo Simulations.  Results from simulation analysis show that larger coalitions are more likely to deter revisionist challenges but, when challenges occur, also cause higher levels of free-riding on partners' war efforts.